NFIU Reveals Sophisticated Terror Funding: Women's Accounts, Crowdfunding Exploited

The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has issued a caution regarding the growing trend of terr*rist financiers leveraging women's bank accounts, improperly registered mobile lines, encrypted transaction notes, and online crowdfunding initiatives to hide and transfer illegal money within Nigeria. This revelation came from the NFIU's 2025 annual report, which detailed several novel approaches being employed to finance terr*rist operations.

Among these methods, the report highlighted the exploitation of bank accounts established in the names of wives, sisters, or other female associates, which are secretly managed by male commanders and their logistics personnel. The NFIU stated, "Terr*rist financiers are opening bank accounts in women’s names while male commanders and logistics managers secretly control them." The agency noted that these groups "exploit cultural norms that make women less likely to be suspected by authorities, using wives, sisters, or female associates as fronts to distance illicit funds from the true operatives."

Some of the women whose accounts are utilized in this manner might be completely unaware of the transactions or the significant sums of money flowing through their accounts, according to the NFIU. The agency termed this deceptive practice "identity laundering," explaining that the male operatives often maintain possession of the ATM cards, mobile banking login details, and personal identification numbers associated with these accounts.

Furthermore, the NFIU's investigation uncovered another tactic for obscuring financial activities: the use of mobile phone numbers either disconnected from or incorrectly linked to the actual account holders. The report indicated that facilitators might employ pre-registered SIM cards, SIM cards belonging to deceased individuals, or numbers linked to unrelated persons for mobile banking services and transaction alerts. "They bypass the security link between SIM cards and Bank Verification Numbers (BVNs) by using pre-registered SIMs, SIMs registered to deceased people, or SIMs tied to gender-based proxies," the agency elaborated. This strategy, the NFIU explained, "severs the audit trail: when a transaction is flagged, investigators trace the phone to an unrelated person, letting the real facilitator stay anonymous and continue operations."

The report also detailed how terr*rist cells, including groups affiliated with the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), employ elaborate and coded descriptions in their transactions to manage payments and disguise their true intent. These groups, the NFIU observed, use specific narrations for logistics-related payments originating from a single source and distributed to multiple recipients, potentially establishing an internal accounting system that appears suspicious to standard financial monitoring systems. To circumvent automated banking filters, facilitators resort to using seemingly harmless words, secret codes, alphanumeric sequences, and even switching between different languages. "Facilitators use this coded language, often switching languages to evade banks’ automated keyword filters that flag terms like ‘Jihad,’ ‘Arms,’ or ‘Boko’," the report highlighted. "This practice obscures the true purpose of transfers, preventing detection and enabling continued financing."

The NFIU additionally identified crowdfunding campaigns and international remittance platforms as potential avenues for moving terr*rist funds into Nigeria. The report described scenarios where a foreign-based facilitator could launch social media campaigns disguised as humanitarian aid or educational support initiatives, subsequently directing unsuspecting donors to specific payment pages or bank accounts. The agency noted that "hundreds of sympathizer donors contribute $50–$500 each, amounts small enough to avoid most automated AML alerts." These collected funds are then consolidated into a master account before being broken down into smaller transfers. These smaller sums are subsequently routed through international money-transfer operators and various remittance applications to "money mules" in Nigeria.

Individuals like students, small-business owners, and even relatives are often recruited as intermediaries. The recipients might then convert the funds into cash, procure items with dual civilian and military uses, or transfer the money via mobile banking to terr*rist logistics managers and field operatives. The NFIU concluded that these discoveries underscore the increasing sophistication of terr*rist financing networks and their cunning exploitation of legitimate banking, telecommunications, and digital fundraising infrastructures to sustain insurgent activities.